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ABSTRACT
The EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft is undergoing a major weapon
system improvement referred to as Improved Capabilities Three (ICAP III). The ICAP
III upgrade presents an opportunity to improve the existing aircraft system for alerting the
crew of potential weapon system problems.
This thesis provides a recommended design for display of weapon-system alerts
in production Lot 1 configured EA-6B ICAP III aircraft. Human factors engineering
methods, the ICAP III system performance specification and the author’s experience
employing electronic warfare weapon systems were used to define required alerts. These
tools along with human factors engineering research and software best practice research
were used by the author to recommend consolidation, format, prioritization, location and
mode of alert presentation. Conclusions will be presented to the EA-6B ICAP III and
E/A-18G design teams for consideration.
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PREFACE
A portion of the information contained within this thesis was obtained from Department
of Defense test reports, FAA documents, and product literature on the design features of
avionics systems from the Northrop Grumman Corporation. The research, discussion,
and conclusions presented are the opinion of the author and should not be construed as an
official position or an endorsement of these products by the United States Naval service,
the United States Government or the University of Tennessee, Space Institute,
Tullahoma, Tennessee.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft first saw Navy service in 1971 and was
referred to as the Standard version. In 1973 the Standard was upgraded to the Extended
Capabilities version or EXCAP. In 1976 the EA-6B was further upgraded to the
Improved Capabilities or ICAP configuration. In 1985 ICAP was followed by the more
sophisticated Improved Capabilities Two version dubbed ICAP II. The ICAP II version
of the EA-6B saw action in Desert Storm, Kosovo and Iraqi Freedom and is the version
of the aircraft currently fielded. Most of these upgrades included changes to both the
aircraft and weapon systems. There are currently two “Blocks” of ICAP II configured
EA-6B aircraft referred to as Block 89 and Block 89A. Block 89A is an avionics upgrade
to Block 89 fielded in 1993. Block 89A did not include any upgrades to the tactical
jamming or receiving (AN/ALQ-99) system.
In 1998 a contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman for the engineering and
manufacturing development of the EA-6B Improved Capabilities Three (ICAP III)
upgrade to the EA-6B aircraft. The ICAP III modification only includes changes to the
weapon system, not to the basic aircraft or non-weapon system avionics. In order to
reduce program risk and shorten the acquisition timeline a decision was made to retain
much of the ICAP II functionality. Germane to this thesis was the decision to retain the
“Zone” structure of the ICAP II display interface (discussed in detail at the end of this
chapter).
EA-6B aircraft avionics (with the exception of the weapons system) have changed
little since the aircraft was introduced over 30 years ago. The first significant avionics
1

upgrade was Block 89A which added a first generation glass cockpit characterized by an
electronic flight information system (EFIS) and flight management system (FMS) but did
not address the system of aircraft alerts. The aircraft alert system is better described as
the “classic” cockpit which is characterized by a simple caution and warning system that
covers only the most critical system failures (Arbuckle, Abbott, & Schutte, 1998). There
is virtually no integration between weapon system and aircraft alerts.

DESCRIPTION OF THE EA-6B AIRCRAFT
The EA-6B aircraft is a four-place, twin-engine, mid-wing monoplane
manufactured by the Grumman Aerospace Corporation (now Northrop Grumman),
Bethpage, Long Island, New York. The aircraft, designed for carrier and advanced base
operation, is a modification of the basic two-place A-6 airframe. The aircraft is an
integrated electronic warfare weapon system that combines long-range, night vision and
all weather capabilities with an advanced electronic countermeasures system. A forward
equipment bay and a pod shaped fairing on the vertical fin house the additional avionics
equipment. The side-by-side cockpit arrangement is designed for maximum efficiency,
visibility, and comfort. The aircraft is characterized by a large nose radome and swept
back wings (EA-6B NATOPS).
The aircraft is separated into two cockpits, forward and aft. Each cockpit seats
two crewmembers. The front cockpit accommodates the pilot and an electronic
countermeasures officer (ECMO). Aircrew in the forward cockpit have historically been
responsible for flying the aircraft, navigation, communications, and communications
countermeasures. The aft cockpit seats two ECMOs who have historically been
2

responsible for electronic surveillance and electronic attack. This historical division-oflabor developed because the ICAP II version of the aircraft only has controls and displays
for the ALQ-99 receiver and jamming system in the aft cockpit. The ICAP III version of
the EA-6B adds controls and displays to both cockpits (discussed in more detail later in
this chapter).

MISSION OF THE EA-6B AIRCRAFT
The mission of the EA-6B aircraft is to provide electronic warfare support for
joint and coalition forces. Electronic warfare support includes electronic attack, and
electronic support. In the case of the EA-6B, “electronic attack” refers to radar and
communications jamming and employment of High-speed Anti Radiation Missiles
(HARM). Electronic support refers to collection, recording and dissemination of
electronic signals of interest. The EA-6B performs these mission areas in several mission
scenarios which include Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), offensive counter
air, deep strike, war at sea, electronic warfare in support of close air support, surface
search coordination, force protection of the battle group, and intelligence preparation of
the battle field.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ICAP III EA-6B AIRCRAFT
The EA-6B ICAP III aircraft is a weapon system upgrade from the ICAP II
version of the EA-6B aircraft. The ICAP III upgrade consists of a “kit” which is used to
modify an existing ICAP II Block 89A EA-6B aircraft. Figure 1 depicts the ICAP III
system block diagram.
3
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Figure 1. ICAP III SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM (EA-6B NATOPS).

The aircraft is modified to the ICAP III configuration by:
1. Removal of the ICAP II receiver system and installation of the
AN/ALQ-218 receiver system along with associated upgrades to
the processing equipment.
2. Removal of the ICAP II Digital Display Indicators, the APS-130
radar Pilot’s Horizontal Display (PHD) and ECMO 1 Direct View
Radar Indicator (DVRI), and installation of color displays at each
crew station. The new color displays along with the associated
interface equipment are referred to as the Tactical Display System
4
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(TDS). The APS-130 radar display is presented on the new color
displays at each crew station.
3. Removal of the current data loader/recorder and installation of the
Mission Reprogramming Unit (MRU), also known as the Data
Storage Memory Unit (DSMU).
4. Integration of the USQ-113 V(3) Radio Countermeasures Set
(RCS) into the display and control system.
5. Integration of the Improved Data Modem (IDM) into the display
and control system.
6. Integration of the Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal
(MATT) into the display and control system.
7. Provisions (wiring, installation, space, power, and cooling) for the
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS).
8. Relocation of the ARA-63 Instrument Landing System (ILS)
antenna by less than two inches.
9. Removal of the Interface Control Unit (ICU). The functions
previously performed by the ICU will be performed by a portion of
the AN/ALQ-218 tactical jamming system receiver (TJSR). (EA6B NATOPS)

In addition to the changes mentioned above, several Weapon Replaceable
Assemblies (WRAs) have been removed and their functions replaced within components
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of the systems listed above. The removed WRAs include the A/D converter, junction box
A, forward and aft power supplies, and the computer interface unit/encoder CIU/E.
From the crew interface perspective the largest change between the ICAP II and
ICAP III systems is the addition of controls and displays for the ALQ-218 tactical
jamming system receiver (TJSR) and ALQ-99 jammers to the forward cockpit. All four
ICAP III displays are color liquid crystal displays (LCDs). ICAP III has a display located
at each crew station in the front and aft cockpits. By comparison the two ICAP II
displays are monochrome green cathode ray tubes (CRT) located at the crew stations in
the aft cockpit only.

DESCRIPTION OF EA-6B DISPLAY FORMATS
The ICAP III displays are formatted in “Zones” which serve to separate the larger display
area into discrete regions by general function. The Zones are depicted in Figure 2 below.
While there are no hard rules for functions or information contained in the Zones, some
generalizations do apply. Zone 1 is primarily software buttons that change the display or
activate other functions. Zone 2 is display of frequency bands or target track information.
Zone 3 is the display of primary information. Zone 4 is display of ALQ-99 jammer pod
information. Zone 5 is display of secondary information and where text or numerical
values are entered. Zone 6 is for display of textural alerts, aircraft position information,
and other ancillary information. The bottom left corner of Zone 6 is the primary location
for weapon-system text alerts. Some form of alert information is presented in every zone
of the displays except Zone 5.
6
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Figure 2. ICAP III DISPLAY ZONES (EA-6B NATOPS).

CURRENT ICAP III DISPLAY COLOR CONVENTION
The current ICAP III color convention uses display color to differentiate detected
emitter function. Detected emitters are displayed in red, yellow or green based on the
relative threat of the function they perform. For example, engagement radars such as
missile guidance or target illumination radars would be displayed in red. Target
acquisition radars would be displayed in yellow, and long-range search or height finding
radars would be displayed in green.
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CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM DEFINITION
DEFINITION OF ALERT
For the purposes of this thesis “alert” will be defined as the attempt to notify the
crew of a condition requiring their attention and possible intervention. It naturally
follows that conditions requiring alert will be those conditions, which if unrecognized by
the crew, could have a negative impact on the safety or success of the mission.

DESCRIPTION OF CONDITIONS REQUIRING ALERT
AIRCRAFT-SYSTEM ALERTS
To aid further discussion, aircraft-system alerts will be differentiated from
weapon-system alerts. Simply put, aircraft-system alerts will refer to those alerts which
do not involve the weapon system. Examples of such alerts include the fire lights panel,
caution lights panel, and forward-cockpit ladder lights panel. These alert locations
indicate fire, failure of critical systems such as hydraulics or generators, low fuel or oil
quantity, or fuel pressure problems. They also indicate condition of systems. The ladder
light panel for example indicates the status of the automatic carrier landing system.
Thirty years of iterative design have provided the current aircraft-system alert
design. Over time alerts have been added in response to lessons learned from operational
use. Because the ICAP III upgrade only changes the weapon system and does not include
any changes to the basic aircraft systems there is no need (or opportunity) to modify the
existing aircraft-system alerts. It is important however, to understand the basic aircraftsystem alerts because the weapon-system alerts generated by ICAP III (and the focus of
this thesis) must make sense in the context of the overall aircraft alert scheme.
8

WEAPON-SYSTEM ALERTS
Within the ICAP III weapon system there are many conditions which require crew
attention. Many of these conditions are carried-over from the ICAP II system although
the complexity of the AN/ALQ-218 has increased the number of alerts required.
Examples of conditions requiring alert include jammer failure, other system failures,
changes in jammer status not involving failures, failure to execute crew instructions due
to error checking, or any other state requiring crew attention.

CURRENT ALERTS
AIRCRAFT-SYSTEM ALERTS
Aircraft-system visually displayed alerts are presented in the forward cockpit
only. Warnings are displayed as red lights and consist of the fire and wheels warning
lights. Aircraft-system cautions are centered around a caution lights panel with
individual lights for various aircraft systems. These lights advise of aircraft system
malfunctions or indicate a particular condition of the applicable system (EA-6B
NATOPS). Caution lights are yellow. There are also “master caution” lights on the
upper instrument panel on both sides of the front cockpit. The master caution lights flash
whenever one of the lights on the caution lights panel is illuminated. The master caution
lights can be extinguished once recognized by the crew, but the light on the caution lights
panel will remain on until the condition is corrected. Advisory lights are presented on the
“ladder lights panel” and provide advisory information on the status of the automatic
carrier landing system. The advisory lights on the ladder lights panel are green. Figure 3
shows the location of all alert lights in the EA-6B front cockpit.
9
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Figure 3. ICAP III FRONT COCKPIT ALERT DISPLAY LOCATIONS
(ICAP III Weapon System Operator’s Manual, 2003).
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The only auditory alert displays are a low altitude warning tone (when the aircraft
descends below the altitude set on the radar altimeter) and a stall warning horn (when
angle of attack exceeds 21 units). Auditory warnings are displayed to all four crew
positions.

WEAPON-SYSTEM ALERTS
All current ICAP III alerts are shown in Appendix A. The alerts are currently
grouped by the display-zone in which they are displayed. They are further
subcategorized by hardware or mission-area affected (listed as “function” in the
appendix). Other than limited color-coding, no effort has been made to group alerts by
severity (advisory, caution or warning).
The original design only incorporated Zone 6 text alerts and Zone 4 jammer
alerts. Throughout the test-analyze-fix development process other alerts were added to
Zones 1 and 6. These additions were to address initial omissions or to provide enhanced
visibility into system health. Because of the tight schedule, little human factors analysis,
prototyping or design iteration was completed as these alerts were added.
Because the alerts list in Appendix A is largely a carry-over from ICAP II, with
additions for the AN/ALQ-218 system, it is very comprehensive for a new weapon
system. Opportunity for both consolidation and reduction exists since the list has only
been through one iteration since it was originally generated. The greater number of
alerts, and the addition of color displays, present both a need and opportunity to improve
alert presentation.
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PROBLEM STATEMENT
The aircraft system and its related alerts are more mature than the weapon-system
alert scheme. There is also no opportunity to change the existing aircraft system alerts
because the ICAP III upgrade only affects the weapon system, not the basic aircraft
systems. Discussion of the existing aircraft-system alerts is germane since they form the
background context in which the weapon-system alerts must be interpreted (both from a
design perspective and as encoded by the crew). In human factors terms, alerts presented
anywhere in the aircraft (aircraft or weapon system related) should be consistent and
compatible. Since the aircraft-system alerts are not likely to change they become a
driving factor for the weapon-system alert design.
The primary challenge addressed by this work will be improvements to the
weapon-system alert displays to correct potential deficiencies identified during
developmental testing of the ICAP III aircraft. The weapon-system alerts described in
the previous paragraphs are not prioritized relative to each other. Resulting in the last
alert generated being displayed on top of previous alerts regardless of severity. There is
no differentiation between severity of alerts by display location or display mode. Alerts
are presented in different locations of the display. Some alerts, which are advisory in
nature, are displayed at the top level while more critical alerts require several button
actuations to view. Color is not always used to display alert severity consistent with
sound human factors engineering practices or the ICAP III color convention. Finally,
there has been little consideration given to integrating aircraft and weapon-system alerts.

12

CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
ICAP III SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
The Electronics Performance Requirements For EA-6B ICAP III Aircraft Systems
Performance Specification (SPS) dated 14 August 2003, under the heading of SPS-2131
states the requirements quite simply as, “(U) Operator alerts”. This obviously gives wide
latitude to satisfy the requirement.

F/A-18 DOCUMENTS
The F/A-18E/F aircraft provides four levels of cuing for the purpose of alerting
the crew to critical aircraft status situations. These are defined as follows from lowest to
highest priority: advisories, cautions with master caution tone and master caution light,
cautions with voice alert and master caution light, warnings with voice alert (H2E System
Configuration Set, 2003). The F/A-18E/F alert strategy would be described as a “first
generation” glass cockpit. The primary characteristic of a first generation glass cockpit
alert system is a “strict hierarchy of warnings (immediate crew action required), cautions
(immediate crew awareness and future action required) and advisories (crew awareness
and possible action required)” (Arbuckle, Abbott & Schutte, 1998).

WARNINGS
Warnings indicate system malfunctions requiring immediate action. The F/A18E/F convention is to display warnings as red warning lights with voice alert (F/A18E/F NATOPS).

13

CAUTIONS
Cautions indicate malfunctions requiring attention but not immediate action. The
F/A-18E/F convention is to display cautions in larger characters than the advisory
displays and immediately above the advisory displays (F/A-18E/F NATOPS). For
certain critical aircraft functions, voice alerting is provided to enhance the level of
aircrew cuing. For cautions in this category, a voice alert message is provided in lieu of
the Master Caution tone (H2E System Configuration Set, 2003). Caution lights are
yellow in the F/A-18 aircraft.

ADVISORIES
Advisories indicate safe or normal conditions and supply information for routine
purposes. The F/A-18E/F convention is to display advisories at the bottom of the display
preceded by “ADV”. Advisory lights are green in the F/A-18 aircraft (F/A-18E/F
NATOPS).

FAA DOCUMENTS
Because of the proliferation of complex integrated avionics the FAA has issued
guidance to “facilitate the identification and resolution of human factors/pilot interface
issues” (FAA N8110.98, 2002). One of the areas covered is warnings, cautions and
advisories of such systems. Even though military aircraft are not generally subject to
FAA certification, there are valuable lessons to be learned from civil experience and
guidance.
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The FAA addresses four primary areas. The first area addressed is determination
of which system generated the alert. This is particularly important as the complexity of
modern systems increases. This is addressed in Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A which
requires “systems, controls and associated monitoring and warning means must be
designed to minimize crew errors”. To this end warning, caution and advisory messages
should be clear, concise and easily interpreted (FAA N8110.98, 2002). The second area
discusses the limited space available on modern displays and the need to prioritize which
alerts occupy the limited space when multiple alerts are generated by the system. The
third area discussed is use of color. FAA advice with respect to color states, “a warning
should be generated when immediate recognition and corrective or compensatory action
is required; the associated color is red. A caution should be generated when immediate
crew awareness and subsequent crew action is required and subsequent crew action will
be required, the associated color is amber/yellow” (Advisory Circular (AC) 25-11). The
final area addressed is differentiation. The FAA advises alert messages should be
differentiated from normal indications. Specifically, “ abnormal indications should use
techniques like shape, size, color, flashing, boxing, outlining, etc. to make them stand out
from normal indications” (Advisory Circular (AC) 23.2311-1A).

HOFFER THESIS
In his thesis titled “Implementing operator-centric cockpit design in the EA-6B
ICAP III aircraft” Thomas Hoffer identified a subset of the problem addressed by this
work. He wrote, " critical weapons system failure alerts can go unnoticed by the
ECMOs." He further defined the critical alerts as, “power degrades to an unacceptable
15

level on any jammer transmitter, antenna steering of a jammer transmitter varies by more
than 5 degrees from the commanded steering, electrical power from the pod RAT is
interrupted, or antenna beam width limitations are exceeded.” The identified failures
were only deemed critical when the MASTER RADIATE switch was in the RADIATE
position, allowing the jammers to transmit. He went on to recommend these alerts be
presented to the crew by “a voice warning system using synthesized speech technology to
present a non-gender, distinctive, mature voice that will present the messages in a formal
and impersonal manner”. His research suggested a message consisting of a “0.5 second
non-voice aural alerting tone followed by a voice message consisting of three to four
syllables with a duration of not less than 1 second or more than 3 seconds” would be the
optimal format. His design recommendations were based on EA-6B Block 89A
configuration with the AN/AIC-14A analog Inter-cockpit Communications System (ICS).
The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the ICAP III aircraft will be Lot I configuration
with the AN/AIC-45 digital ICS which has an enhanced ability to generate the types of
auditory displays recommended (Hoffer, 2000).

HUMAN FACTORS TEXTS
HUMAN FACTORS IN THE S/W DESIGN PROCESS
The primary human factors consideration in software design is the interface. The
interface is also one of the last functional stages of design (Meister & Enderwick, 2002)
and often occurs (at least in part) during the test phase. This is largely due to the
dependant and iterative nature of interface design.
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The importance of this iterative cycle has been described as, “a critical component
of the user testing and prototyping development cycle” (C. Marlin Brown, 1998). It’s
important to note the design presented by this thesis will not be the final stage of this
iteration. “Problems discovered in a test cycle must be addressed in a revised design (the
purpose of this work) then the revised design must be tested. Otherwise, there is no
guarantee that the revised design is better than the original” (Brown, 1998). Prototyping
and usability testing of a proposed design is beyond the scope of this work. However,
“the effect of redesigns can be enhanced if, as criteria, they are buttressed by quantitative
design relevant human factors research” (Meister & Enderwick, 2002). This chapter
clearly seeks to provide such buttressing.

DESIGN GUIDELINES
Display
The term display can be used to describe almost any indirect form of presenting
information. Examples include visual, auditory, tactile and olfactory, often referred to as
display modalities (Sanders & McCormick, 1993).

Display Format
For our purposes “format” will be used to describe where information is
displayed. This is in contrast to “method” (discussed next) which will be used to describe
how information is displayed. An important principal when discussing display format is
the principal of consistency. Consistency refers to maintaining the same style of
interaction throughout operations (Meister & Enderwick, 2002). For visual displays there
17

are several methods available to help achieve consistency. These include reserved
display areas which use fixed display locations or screen areas for the same information.
These can be broken down into two types, invariant fields and functional category fields
(Brown, 1988). An invariant field stays the same on every screen or page (Engel &
Granda, 1997). A functional category field is reserved for certain types of data (Engel &
Granda, 1997). Another important factor is “data order” which refers to arranging items
in some recognizable or useful order. The data order strategy of “Importance grouping”
makes the most sense for alert displays. Importance grouping refers to the arrangement
of the most significant information, or that requiring immediate response, at the top of a
list (Brown, 1988).

Display Method
As previously stated, “method” will be used to describe how information is
displayed. Because the ICAP III aircraft has no capability to generate tactile or olfactory
displays only visual and auditory display methods will be discussed. Within the visual
and auditory categories, only display methods available consistent with operation aboard
tactical aircraft will be discussed. In general this means displays which can be generated
by cathode ray tube (CRT) or liquid crystal display (LCD) type technologies, or digital
inter cockpit communications (ICS) systems.

Visual Display Methods
Many techniques are available to differentiate alerts from other information
presented on the visual displays. The presence or absence of a display window or field
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may be used to indicate the presence or absence of any type of alert. For example if the
alert window is displayed there is an alert present. If the window is absent there are no
alerts.
Within the alert window various strategies may be employed to help quickly
determine the relative severity of alerts. These include color, text size, text font and text
effects like blinking, highlighting, and reverse video. These techniques can be employed
separately or used in combination. Caution must be exercised to avoid over use of
attention getting techniques to avoid visual discomfort. This is especially true for
blinking and highlighting (Brown, 1988).

Auditory Display Methods
“In selecting or designing displays for transmission of information in some
situations, the selection of the sensory modality is virtually a forgone conclusion.
Specifically, the unique features of the auditory system make auditory displays especially
useful for warnings and alarms” (Sanders & McCormick, 1993). This isn’t to say
auditory alerts should be used without regard to the system in which they will be
integrated. In particular, the following rules-of-thumb apply to presentation of auditory
displays: “avoid extremes of auditory dimensions; establish intensity relative to ambient
noise level; use interrupted or variable signals; do not overload the auditory channel”
(Sanders & McCormick, 1993). These rules are particularly important in an EA-6B
cockpit where the crew’s auditory channel is heavily loaded listening to three radios and
four crewmembers on the ICS.
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WEB PAGE USABILITY
The ICAP III displays are modified commercial hardware with interface designs
based on (and limited by) a commercial software architecture. Multiple pages (breadth)
and layers (depth) of information are also displayed. This format is similar to
commercial web site design where related pages of information are linked together and
must be navigated. As such the design challenges for the ICAP III displays are similar to
commercial web page design. It follows that factors important to effective design of web
sites should be useful in optimizing the ICAP III interface. The following information
was taken from the web site http://www.humanfactors.com.
One conclusion drawn from studies of web page navigation is
that color similarity has a stronger perceptual influence than common
region, proximity, or grouping (Beck and Palmer, 2002). A similar but
more generalized conclusion was that effective sub-grouping reduces
perceived breadth and grouping navigation elements by theme
improves performance for even the broadest structures. Creating clear
and distinct labels for navigation elements enhances performance.
Lastly, users only perceive / encode (change in) elements of the
display that they are directly focused on (Simon & Chabris, 1999).
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
This work seeks to utilize a design approach described as, “Hill climbing from a
predecessor artifact.” This is defined as, ”Design decisions motivated by an analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of an existing system in terms of functionality, interface
techniques, or tasks implied by these. A perceived problem may be fixed or a new
feature added” (Meister & Enderwick, 2002). Tools to complete this analysis include the
authors experience in more than 150 hours of ICAP III flight test and interviews with
other experienced aircrew to define the conditions requiring alert. Once defined, the
same methodology was used to separate alerts by severity into the categories of warnings,
cautions and advisories as defined earlier. Finally, a review of military standards, F/A-18
design standards, FAA documents, a related thesis by Thomas Hoffer, human factors
texts, web page usability texts and the author’s extensive experience in EA-6B ICAP III
and F/A-18G design was used to make recommendations for design improvement of the
ICAP III alert system.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Like many modern weapon-system interfaces, the ICAP III crew vehicle interface
is a complex, software controlled fusion of a tremendous amount of information.
Containing a great amount of information both on the primary display pages (breadth)
and nearly an equal amount of information available by selecting sub-displays (depth).
As such the display interface has usability challenges similar to an internet web page.
The tools available to meet these challenges are also similar because the ICAP III display
hardware, and much of the underlying software, are commercial-off-the-shelf and
therefore similar to that used in commercial internet applications.

INTEGRATION
This modern, commercial-based interface must also be integrated into the reality
of the existing EA-6B cockpit. Weapon-system alerts have to make sense in relation to
the existing aircraft-system alerts. For example, it doesn’t make sense to have weapon
system related warnings, sounding sirens and flashing lights, while the existing engine
fire indication is simply a steady red light. While minor modifications to the existing
aircraft alert scheme may be possible, to help harmonize weapon-system and aircraftsystem alerts, changes to existing aircraft-system alerts will not be addressed in this
work.
Prior to the ICAP III upgrade, weapon-system alerts were only presented to the aft
cockpit crew, and aircraft system alerts (except for auditory warnings) were only
presented to the front cockpit crew. With the introduction of weapon-system controls and
displays to the front cockpit, as part of the ICAP III upgrade, this separate cockpit
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scheme for alert management is no longer necessary; which doesn’t necessarily mean it’s
no longer desirable.

PRIORITIZATION
ICAP III alerts need to be prioritized and the prioritization scheme needs to make
sense in the context of the existing aircraft-system alerts. Warnings should be displayed
ahead of cautions, which should be displayed ahead of advisories. Within categories
(warning, caution or advisory) alerts should be displayed in the order generated. For
example when three advisories are generated, the last one generated should be displayed
in higher precedence than the first, but after all the cautions or warnings. Warnings and
cautions should provide sufficient information at the top level to inform the crew what
condition exists and what corrective action is necessary. Advisories should provide
sufficient information at the top level to inform the crew what system is affected and
where to look for amplifying information if required.

CONSOLIDATION
Because the ICAP III upgrade added more alerts in addition to previously
existing ICAP II alerts, and the display interface is only beginning the iterative design
process, there is still a need for alert consolidation. Consolidating alerts adds display
complexity. In order to get the detail required from a consolidated alert there must be a
method to expand for more detail. This expansion could be on the same page creating
greater breadth, or on a different page creating more depth. This would force the crew to
“navigate” the display to find the detail needed.
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By definition warnings and cautions direct action. Therefore, they need to be
fairly explicit. This means there is less opportunity for consolidation of warning or
caution messages because having the crew search for amplifying information is not
desirable when action is required. Unlike warnings and cautions, advisories by definition
do not require timely action. In the case of advisories it is desirable to consolidate
display at the top level, provided the consolidated alerts are sufficient to direct the crew
to a source of amplifying information. Consolidation reduces clutter on the primary
display, helps suppress multiple advisories from the same system and reduces crew
distraction.

USE OF COLOR
It is clear from almost every source that color is a powerful discriminator. It is
also apparent, from FAA regulations and various human factors texts sited earlier, that a
powerful learned association exists linking red with danger, yellow with caution and
green with normal operations. Both F/A-18 and EA-6B designs use this association when
presenting aircraft-system warnings, cautions and advisories. It is also apparent the
existing ICAP III weapon-system alerts do not take advantage of this association.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion. First, alert
consolidation and display grouping is required. The effects on display navigation
complexity must be assessed. Visual and auditory alert presentation must be integrated
into the existing aircraft-system and ICAP III weapon-system architecture. The
following paragraphs provide detailed discussion of these areas.

CONSOLIDATION OF ALERTS
Consolidation and clarification of alerts are needed to correct deficiencies
identified during ICAP III developmental testing. The existing ICAP III alert strategy
has an abundance of poorly associated and overly detailed alerts (Appendix A). The
current alerts are also scattered over the entire display area as shown in Figure 4.
Appendix B shows the proposed alerts grouped by severity (warnings, cautions and
advisories) and the alerts recommended for removal. Note that warnings and cautions
have not been consolidated, but advisories have been consolidated where practical. For
example, the over fifty Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT) alerts have
been reduced to a single advisory displayed as “MATT”. Figure 4 also shows the
recommended location of the alert window described in detail below.

DISPLAY NAVIGATION
The meaning of warnings and cautions is explicit at the top display level
and no further navigation is required before taking corrective action. Further detail for
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Proposed Alert Location

Current Alert Locations

Figure 4. ICAP III CURRENT AND PROPOSED ALERT LOCATIONS.
(ICAP III Weapon System Operator’s Manual, 2003).
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advisories may be obtained by selecting the existing Jammer Assignment Status (JAS)
page for jammer advisories, or the existing Built In Test (BIT) page for all other
advisories. Therefore display navigation with the proposed alert design is actually
simpler and more straightforward than the current design despite the consolidation of
alerts and locations.

VISUAL DISPLAY CONCLUSIONS
Alerts will be displayed in a dedicated window placed at the top center of Zone 3
on the existing primary tactical display pages (Figure 4). When no alerts are present the
window will be stowed (not displayed). Display on the primary tactical display pages is
sufficient because each individual crewmember spends over 80% of their time on these
pages, and between all members of the crew one of these pages is selected almost all the
time. Auditory display will ensure recognition in the unlikely event that no members of
the crew have the primary tactical display pages selected. Auditory display will be
discussed in more detail below.
The alert window will be of sufficient size to allow one 16 character alert to be
displayed. Warnings will be displayed over cautions which will be displayed over
advisories. Within categories the last alert generated will be displayed on top. When
more than one alert is present a drop-down arrow [▼] will be placed on the right side of
the window indicating more information is available by expanding the window. Placing
the cursor on the drop-down arrow and pressing the SEL(select) key on the Aircraft
Keyboard Pointing Device (AKPD), or placing the cursor in the alert window and
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selecting the MENU button on the (AKPD) will “pull down” a larger window showing all
active alerts (Figure 5). This expanded displayed will present alerts in the same order
discussed above. This function is consistent with other ICAP III window functionality
and is already supported by existing software and hardware. Alerts will be displayed as
black text, highlighted by the appropriate color for the severity of the alert. Warnings
will be highlighted red, cautions yellow and advisories green.

ICAP III ALERT INTEGRATION WITH AIRCRAFT-SYSTEM ALERTS
Aircraft-system alerts potentially reflect danger to the safety of the aircraft.
Weapon-system alerts potentially reflect danger to the success of the mission. Fusing

Select Button

Menu Button

Figure 5. AIRBORNE KEYBOARD POINTING DEVICE
(ICAP III Weapon System Operator’s Manual, 2003).
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these two related yet distinct alert types on the same display may seem desirable at first
glance. However, having a physical distinction in display location (aircraft-system alerts
displayed on dedicated light panels while weapon-system alerts are displayed on the
TDS) serves to separate, define and solidify the potential impact.
This isn’t to imply that integration is not needed. A seemingly sensible but
suboptimum solution would be reached if the weapon system were viewed apart from the
context of integration in the EA-6B. In fact, the EA-6B historic division-of-labor
between the front and aft cockpit crews provides a simple and effective solution. Even
though the ICAP III modification makes some weapon-system controls and displays
available to the front cockpit crew, the aft cockpit crew has most of the controls to correct
weapon system related problems.
Current aircraft-system alerts are not selectable by the crew. That is to say they
are displayed whenever conditions warrant, cannot be deselected, and are of fixed volume
(can not be turned down). This scheme should continue to be followed for any additional
auditory aircraft-system alerts added in the future. On the other hand, weapon-system
alerts would integrate more easily if they could be selected by the crew. For example the
aft crew could elect to hear weapon-system auditory alerts while the front cockpit crew
chose not to. Or all three ECMOs could elect to hear weapon-system alerts but the pilot
could choose not to. This would allow those members of the crew controlling the
weapon system to have auditory cueing of system malfunction without interfering with
the forward crew’s (or pilot’s) situational awareness of the aircraft-systems status. This
discussion only pertains to auditory alerts, as the visual alerts will be present on all four
displays as discussed earlier.
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AUDITORY DISPLAY CONCLUSIONS
Whenever conditions exist to generate a weapon-system warning, an auditory
display consisting of an interrupted beeping tone of 0.5 second duration (Hoffer, 2000)
should be presented to any crew station with weapon-system tone selected on the ICS
control panel. The purpose of this tone is to alert the crew to the presence of a weaponsystem warning and direct their attention to the visual warning display or to the primary
tactical displays if not already selected. If a member of the crew did not have one of the
primary tactical display pages selected, those pages could be reached by a single button
actuation. The auditory warning would only be displayed once for each occurrence of a
persistent weapon-system warning. Because timely action is not required, cautions and
advisories would not have an associated auditory alert. If a warning were corrected and
then reoccurred the auditory warning would also reoccur.
Voice aural alerts are not recommended for weapon-system alerts for three
reasons. First, an interrupted tone is sufficient to alert the crew to the presence of a
weapon-system warning, and the visual display can adequately present the needed detail.
Second, voice aural alerts could saturate the crew’s auditory channel in a cockpit where
three radios and four crewmembers could all be presenting voice information to the crew.
Lastly, voice aural alerts are more appropriate for safety related aircraft-system alerts.
Therefore an interrupted tone weapon-system auditory alert satisfies the requirement for
weapon-system related warnings and makes sense in the existing, and possible future,
aircraft-system alert schemes.
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CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend NAVAIR PMA-234 identify resources and contract for prototyping
of the alert design proposed above. Initial prototyping could be accomplished at the
software support activity at Point Mugu, California. Once a prototype has been created
developmental testing should be performed to ensure correction of previously identified
deficiencies. Usability testing should be conducted to determine the level of
improvement over the previous implementation. If necessary another iteration should
begin to further improve the design.
A study should be undertaken to determine the feasibility of integrating existing
aircraft-system alerts with the AN/AIC-45 digital ICS. Such integration would better
align the EA-6B alert system with the existing “first generation” glass cockpit (Arbuckle,
Abbott, & Schutte, 1998). It would also harmonize aircraft-system and weapon-system
alerts.
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APPENDIX A
CURRENT ICAP III ALERTS
ZONE 1 ALERTS
ALERT INDICATOR

ALERT MEANING

BIT Label red
IDM Label red
JAS Label red
MATT Label red
Own-ship Latitude/Longitude white on red
background
PHASE Dropdown Label background
yellow
PE RA white on blue background
TT RA white blue background
TUNE Indicator white on red background
DET Indicator white on red background
TUNE Indicator white on black background
DET Indicator white on black background
TUNE L Indicator white on black
background
DET L Indicator white on black
background
TUNE H Indicator white on black
background
DET H Indicator white on black
background
TUNE L Indicator black on green
background
DET L Indicator black on green
background
TUNE H Indicator white on black
background
DET H Indicator white on black
background
TUNE L Indicator black on yellow
background

FUNCTION

CBIT failure is reported.
Own-ship receives an IDM off board Free Text or SEAD
message.
Assignment Not Made (any reason)
Classified MATT OFP has been loaded, but MATT is
determined to be not mission capable
No navigation data or invalid latitude/longitude.
Phase Transition criteria has been met.
RA Protected Entity Mode is enabled.
RA Target Tracks Mode is enabled.
No TJSR power, or no IM heartbeat.
No TJSR power, or no IM heartbeat.
TJSR power AND IM heartbeat.
TJSR power AND IM heartbeat.
LR-700 did not complete an Aux Receiver dwell during the
last LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 did not receive Low Band pulse data in Aux receiver
during the last LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 did not complete a primary receiver dwell during the
last LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 did not receive pulse data in primary receiver during
the last LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 completed an Aux Receiver dwell during the last LR700 Status cycle.
LR-700 received Low Band pulse data in Aux receiver during
the last LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 completed a primary receiver dwell during the last
LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 received pulse data in primary receiver during the last
LR-700 Status cycle.
LR-700 in Spot Monitor or Selected Video mode.

BIT
IDM
JAM MGMT
MATT
NAV
PHASE
MISSION
SYS STAT
SYS STAT
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR

ZONE 4 ALERTS
ALERT INDICATOR
Line 1 red background Line 2 red
‘P’
Line 1 yellow background Line 2
yellow ‘S’
Line 1 red ‘!’

ALERT MEANING
Power loss. XMTR power below threshold.
Steering Failure. XMTR antenna feedback does not agree with commanded
steering.
Pod mismatch. Either a UE has been detected with a UEU JT Library loaded,
or UEU detected with a UE JT Lib loaded.
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FUNCTION
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT

JAMMER ASSIGNMENT STATUS (JAS) PAGE ALERTS
JAS ALERT TEXT

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

INVJT
NOJMR

Assignment Not Made – Invalid Jam Technique
Assignment Not Made – No Available Jammer

JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT

LPRTY
FCOFF
CLRD
STR
PCOFF
NOCOM

Assignment Not Made – Low Priority
Assignment Not Made – FASTCOMM Off
Assignment Not Made – Assignment Cleared
Assignment Not Made –Incompatible Steering
Assignment Not Made –PRIORITY CLEAR Off
Assignment Not Made –No COM Mode Channel
Available
Assignment Not Made – No Radar Mode Channel
Available
Assignment Not Made –Incompatible Jam Technique
Assignment Not Made –Incompatible Polarization
Assignment Not Made –Mode Switch Failure
Assignment Not Made – Com Mode Failure
Assignment Not Made – Radar Mode Failure
Assignment TSA-Modified
Assignment FASTCOMM

JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT

NORDR
INCJT
POL
MODEF
COMFL
RDRFL
-*
-F

JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT

ZONE 6 ALERTS
TEXT ALERT
REJECT PURGE
TDSIU OVERTEMP
TDSIU FAIL
VDP-IM PROC FL
MM PROC FAIL
MIO FAIL
TDSIU RSC FAIL
TDSIU POWER FL
TDSIU HUB FAIL
MAX LIST
POSS MSL EMI
CANT ADD LIST
INV HARM PRI
INCOMP MSLBLK
LSTNG SHORTD
NO MSL RDY
AVOID LAUNCH
RU BSITEONLY
MSTER RAD ON
CNT MTCH FRQ
TGTSEL FULL

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

IM rejects operator purge request.
TDSIU temperature out of limits
TDSIU has failed
Information management processor has failed
Mission management processor has failed
Miscellaneous input/output fail
Radar scan converter fail
TDSIU power fail
TDSIU LAN hub fail
At the time ASGN was depressed to transfer threat listings to
the HCP, there existed more than the max allowed listings for
the selected block missile.
MSL RDY condition with MSTR RAD on and a jammer
assignment in band
No match found between AEF parameter and threat listings
for current HARM code.
One or more PRIs in Hand-Off-Word Is out of range for the
selected Block missile.
Operator attempted to assign a target packet with a missile
block ID that is incompatible with the HCP selected missile.
More than 15 listings, compatible with the selected missile
block, were available at the time of assignment to the HCP.
Attempt to turn on ABL mode with no MSL RDY condition.
Missile selected with Seeker and/or Control Section BIT
failure(s).
Missile selected with Baro Sensor BIT failure.
Attempt to turn on ABL with active high band jamming or
activating jamming while ABL is on.
Attempt to turn on ABL when no listing includes Pre-Launch
Frequency.
Attempt to create a fifth HARM TGT packet.

AEF MGMT
BIT
BIT
BIT
BIT
BIT
BIT
BIT
BIT
HARM

37

HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM

ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED)
TEXT ALERT
CHK MSL BLK

INAP HARM DA
IDM MSG RCV ER
ILLEGAL FREQ

CANT ASG XX
CANT CLR XX
POD INTRPT X
JMRS ASGD XX
POD MISMATCH
PRESS REVAL

ASGN IN PROG
NO NEW JAM RQMT
CANNOT REASSIGN
INVAL JAM TECH
TRACKER UNAVAL
TTRK NOT IN USE
BND SWTCH FAULT
NO ASGN BFR FUL
CM PR CL ASG
INAP JAMMING
JAM ASGN
NON EXISTNT CTF
NON EXISTNT AEF
JMR BW LIMIT
MATT CTF 80 PCT
MATT CTF 90 PCT

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

The Glide and/or Geo Spec settings that would be
displayed in Zone 5 TGTRNG are not compatible with
the HCP selected missile that has just had a target
packet assigned.
TJSR or operator designated best fit has changed
classification of an AEF for which a HARM target packet
has been created.
An error was detected when the CMC attempted to
receive a message from IDM.
Operator attempts a jammer assignment to Band 1, 2, or
extended Band 7 that are not covered by the respective
transmitter or the frequency is outside the UEU
frequency limits.
Operator attempts a jammer assignment and a 1553
data bus transmission error to station XX is detected for
3 successive data transmissions.
Operator attempts to clear a jammer assignment to
station XX and a 1553 data bus transmission error is
detected for three successive data transmissions.
Exciter on pod station X has indicated a primary power
interruption that results in loss of all jammer
assignments in both stations of that exciter.
Operator performs a Clear Files, CMC IPL or library load
when jammer assignments exist on station XX.
Library load does not match UE/UEU Pod Load out.
The operator attempts to change a FWS priority within
the current mission phase or change a target track
priority within the current mission phase or designate a
target track PHASE PA eligible or ineligible within the
current mission phase or load a library that has one or
more PHASE PA eligible target tracks in mission phase
one.
A low band adjustment is in progress.
Jamming Assignment that will use MNB Jam Strategy
but all of the beams are already covered by existing
jamming assignment.
System cannot do a jammer reassign.
Operator request DA with invalid jam technique.
CMC request LR-700 trackers, and no more trackers
available.
Operator attempts a jamming assignment to a Target
Track that is not in-use, i.e., does not exist.
Operator attempts to switch band of a band-switchable
XMTR, and status is reported back as not switched.
Jam assignment request results in a not-made, and
there is no room in the not-made buffer.
The system clears jamming assignment(s) for any of
several reasons.
Operator designates a new best fit for an AEF that has
current active AA jamming requirement.
Operator attempts to purge a target track that has
jamming assignment.
Operator attempts a jamming assignment against a CTF
that MM does not have.
Operator attempts a jamming assignment against an
AEF that MM does not have.
System determines that two or more jamming
assignments on the same transmitter are no longer
covered by the transmitter antenna beam width.
MATT CTF is 80% full
MATT CTF is 90% full

HARM
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HARM
IDM
JAM MGMT

JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT

JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
JAM MGMT
MATT
MATT

ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED)
TEXT ALERT
MATT CTF FULL
M-ILO USER ID
M-ILO STATE
M-ILO FORMAT
M-ILO RPM
M-ILO PG LEN
M-ILO DTG
M-ILO TRAF TYPE
M-ISM LOGD ON
M-ISM RMT ONOFF
M-ISM LOG OFF
M-ISM RMT FLTR
M-ISM RMT BYPSS
M-ISM RMT TAB
M-ISM STATE
M-GLF NOT SPMGR
M-CIS NOT SPMGR
M-USP NOT SPMGR
M-FRP NOT SPMGR
M-LDF NOT SPMGR
M-CCF NOT SPMGR
M-GLF FILE IND
M-CIS FILE IND
M-USP FILE IND
M-FRP FILE IND
M-LDF FILE IND
M-CCF FILE IND
M-GLF NUM EXCD
M-CIS NUM EXCD
M-USP NUM EXCD
M-FRP NUM EXCD
M-LDF NUM EXCD
M-CCF NUM EXCD
M-GLF FIELD
M-CIS FIELD
M-USP FIELD
M-FRP FIELD
M-LDF FIELD
M-CCF FIELD
M-GLF REC NAME
M-CIS REC NAME
M-USP REC NAME
M-FRP REC NAME
M-LDF REC NAME
M-CCF REC NAME
M-GLF USER ID
M-CIS USER ID
M-USP USER ID
M-FRP USER ID
M-LDF USER ID
M-CCF USER ID
M-GLF IN USE
M-CIS IN USE
M-USP IN USE
M-FRP IN USE
M-LDF IN USE
M-CCF IN USE

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

MATT CTF is full
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects a Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects an SP Manager Log-on/Log-off Request
MATT rejects an SP Manager Remote Log-on/Log-off request
MATT rejects an SP Manager Log-off Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Bypass Request
MATT rejects Tabular Print Fields Request
MATT rejects an SP Manager Log-on/Log-off Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request

MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
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ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED)
TEXT ALERT
M-CIS NOTATION
M-FRP OWNPOS
M-CCF ACTIVE
M-LDF ACTIVE
M-LDF REFRENCD
M-IMR RPT TYPE
M-IMR USER ID
M-IMR FILE IND
M-IMR FIELD
M-IMR EXEC FAIL
M-ADF USER ID
M-ADF STATE
M-ADF NO GLF
M-ADB USER ID
M-ADB STATE
M-CID NOT SPMGR
M-CID USER ID
M-CID CI LIST
M-CID NOT FOUND
M-CIF NOT SPMGR
M-CIF CI LIST
M-ADR NOT SPMGR
M-ADR RCVR ID
M-ADR STATE
M-ADR CMD FAIL
M-ADR LOOP FAIL
M-RLC NOT SPMGR
M-RLC RCVR ID
M-RLC REC NAME
M-RCP NOT SPMGR
M-RCP RCVR ID
M-RCP COMSEC
M-RCP RCVR DATA
M-RCP MODE DATA
M-SID NOT SPMGR
M-SID DEVICE
NAV MODE CHG
NEW PHASE
MRU TOP CARD FL
MRU BOT CARD FL
CMC RESET
TGT TRK FULL
EEPROM CHKSM
TJSR NO NAV
TJSR SW RESET
TJSR INT RESET
TJSR AEF FULL
TJSR PGM LD FL

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects File Record Request
MATT rejects MATT Report Request
MATT rejects MATT Report Request
MATT rejects MATT Report Request
MATT rejects MATT Report Request
MATT rejects MATT Report Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Bypass Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Filter Bypass Request
MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List
Request
MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List
Request
MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List
Request
MATT rejects Correlation Index Distribution List
Request
MATT rejects Correlation Index Filter List Request
MATT rejects Correlation Index Filter List Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request
MATT rejects Activate/Deactivate Receiver Request
MATT rejects Receiver Link Configuration Request
MATT rejects Receiver Link Configuration Request
MATT rejects Receiver Link Configuration Request
MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request
MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request
MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request
MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request
MATT rejects Receiver Control Parameters Request
MATT rejects Symbol ID Filter Request
MATT rejects Symbol ID Filter Request
Navigation Mode has changed or CMC has transitioned
into or out of CMC BACKUP MODE.
Indicates that the operator has transitioned from one
mission phase to another.
Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU top
card
Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU
bottom card.
CMC
Operator attempts to establish the 33rd target track.
CMC EEPROM checksum does not match stored value
LR-700 has not received a Nav Data message for a
period of time greater than 3 times the nominal Nav data
period and has suspended tuning.
LR-700 software has reset in response to an internal
error condition or an IM command.
LR-700 software has reset interfaces in response to an
internal error condition or an IM command.
AEF Overload.
LR-700 was unable to load an OFP from the MRU.

MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
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MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
MATT
NAV
PHS MSN
RECORDING
RECORDING
SYS STAT
SYS STAT
SYS STAT
TJSR

TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR

ZONE 6 ALERTS (CONTINUED)
TEXT ALERT
TJSR MDB FL
TJSR RA REVISIT
TJSR TER LD FL
TJSR MRU COM FL
TJSR NAV INCNST
TJSR WRAx TEMP

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

LR-700 was unable to load an MDB file from the MRU.
The ratio of Need to Revisit interval stays above one for
RA sub-bands for more than one second
LR-700 was unable to load terrain data from the MRU.
LR-700 was unable to communicate with the MRU.
Nav Data is Valid but inconsistent with previous Nav
Data.
ALQ-218 Not Warmed-Up. This alert will be sent if the
ALQ-218 has determined that it is sufficiently cold to not
achieve full performance.

TJSR
TJSR
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TJSR
TJSR
TJSR
TJSR

APPENDIX B
PROPOSED ALERTS
WARNINGS
ALERT INDICATOR
POWER LOSS
STEERING
BEAM WIDTH LIMIT

ALERT MEANING
Transmitter power below threshold.
Antenna feedback does not agree with commanded steering.
Two or more jamming assignments on the same transmitter are no
longer covered by the transmitter antenna beam width.

FUNCTION
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers

CAUTIONS
ALERT INDICATOR
PHASE CHANGE
TJSR TUNING
POD MISMATCH
TDSIU TEMP
TJSR NO NAV
TJSR WRA (X) TEMP

ALERT MEANING
Time to change phase.
TJSR high or low band tuning failure
Library load does not match UE/UEU Pod Load out.
TDSIU temperature above limit.
No nav data available to the TJSR.
TJSR WRA (X) temperature above limit.

FUNCTION
Jammers
TJSR
Jammers
TDSIU
TJSR
TJSR

ADVISORIES
ALERT INDICATOR
IDM
IDM MSG RCV ER
JAMMERS
MATT
NAV
REJECT PURGE
TRACKER UNAVAL
TDSIU
MAX HARM LIST
CAN’T ADD LIST
INV HARM PRI
INCOMP MSLBLK
LSTNG SHORTD
NO MSL RDY
AVOID LAUNCH
RU B SITE ONLY
MSTER RAD ON
CNT MTCH FRQ
TGTSEL FULL
CHK MSL BLK
INAP HARM DA

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

An IDM degrade has been detected
An error was detected when the CMC attempted to receive a message
from IDM.
A requested jamming assignment was not made. Excuse on the JAS
page.
A MATT degrade has been detected
A navigation degrade has been detected
A purge request has been rejected
CMC request LR-700 trackers, and no more trackers available.
A TDSIU degrade has been detected
Maximum HARM lists have been reached
A HARM ELINT modification was rejected
HARM PRI out of limits
Operator attempted to assign a target packet with a missile block ID
that is incompatible with the HCP selected missile.
More than 15 listings, compatible with the selected missile block,
were available at the time of assignment to the HCP.
Attempt to turn on ABL mode with no MSL RDY condition.
Missile selected with Seeker and/or Control Section BIT failure(s).
Missile selected with Baro Sensor BIT failure.
Attempt to turn on ABL with active high band jamming or activating
jamming while ABL is on.
Attempt to turn on ABL when no listing includes Pre-Launch
Frequency.
Attempt to create a fifth HARM TGT packet.
The Glide and/or Geo Spec settings that would be displayed in Zone
5 TGTRNG are not compatible with the HCP selected missile that
has just had a target packet assigned.
TJSR or operator designated best fit has changed classification of an
AEF for which a HARM target packet has been created.

IDM
IDM
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Jammers
MATT
NAV
TJSR
TJSR
TDSIU
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM
HARM

ADVISORIES (CONTINUED)
ALERT INDICATOR
IDM MSG RCV ER
ILLEGAL FREQ
CANT ASG XX
CANT CLR XX
POD INTRPT X
JMRS ASGD XX
POD MISMATCH
PRESS REVAL

ASGN IN PROG
NO NEW JAM RQMT
CANNOT REASSIGN
INVAL JAM TECH
TTRK NOT IN USE
BND SWTCH FAULT
NO ASGN BFR FUL
CM PR CL ASG
INAP JAMMING
JAM ASGN

ALERT MEANING

FUNCTION

An error was detected when the CMC attempted to receive a message
from IDM.
Operator attempts a jammer assignment to Band 1, 2, or extended
Band 7 that are not covered by the respective transmitter or the
frequency is outside the UEU frequency limits.
Operator attempts a jammer assignment and a 1553 data bus
transmission error to station XX is detected for 3 successive data
transmissions.
Operator attempts to clear a jammer assignment to station XX and a
1553 data bus transmission error is detected for three successive data
transmissions.
Exciter on pod station X has indicated a primary power interruption
that results in loss of all jammer assignments in both stations of that
exciter.
Operator performs a Clear Files, CMC IPL or library load when
jammer assignments exist on station XX.
Library load does not match UE/UEU Pod Load out.
The operator attempts to change a FWS priority within the current
mission phase or change a target track priority within the current
mission phase or designate a target track PHASE PA eligible or
ineligible within the current mission phase or load a library that has
one or more PHASE PA eligible target tracks in mission phase one.
A low band adjustment is in progress.
Jamming Assignment that will use MNB Jam Strategy but all of the
beams are already covered by existing jamming assignment.
System cannot do a jammer reassign.
Operator request DA with invalid jam technique.
Operator attempts a jamming assignment to a Target Track that is not
in-use, i.e., does not exist.
Operator attempts to switch band of a band-switchable XMTR, and
status is reported back as not switched.
Jam assignment request results in a not-made, and there is no room in
the not-made buffer.
The system clears jamming assignment(s) for any of several reasons.
Operator designates a new best fit for an AEF that has current active
AA jamming requirement.
Operator attempts to purge a target track that has jamming
assignment.

IDM
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers

Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers
Jammers

ALERTS RECOMMENDED FOR REMOVAL
ALERT INDICATOR
TRACKER UNAVAL
MRU TOP CARD FL
MRU BOT CARD FL
CMC RESET
TGT TRK FULL
EEPROM CHKSM

ALERT MEANING
CMC request LR-700 trackers, and no more trackers available.
Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU top card
Operator attempts to initiate recording on a full MRU bottom card.
CMC
Operator attempts to establish the 33rd target track.
CMC EEPROM checksum does not match stored value
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FUNCTION
Jammers
RECORDING
RECORDING
SYS STAT
SYS STAT
SYS STAT
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